

THE IDEALISTIC-ESTHETIC WORLD VISIONS OF
PERK AND NOVALIS

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This paper centres on Jacques Perk and his development of an idealistic-esthetic theory of man and the universe. His ideas are amazingly similar to, but were developed completely independently of, those of Novalis around 1800. And as we will show, both theories anticipate Jung's in astonishing detail. They are also ideas "in the air" in Perk's time, as we see by examining relevant views of other "Tachtigers" such as Verwey and van Eeden and their near-contemporary Hofmannsthal.

Both Novalis' and Perk's main creative works, the "Bildungsroman" Heinrich von Ofterdingen and the Mathilde Cycle of Sonnets, display a high degree of similarity in their basic motifs. One and the same formulation can be proposed for them. It runs as follows: Through an intense, numinously religious love for a young woman (a love revealing her as a mythical embodiment of an ideal universe in himself), an exceptionally gifted and intelligent, but at first insecure and confused young man achieves full and balanced development of his already inborn self, in a Jungian "individuation"-process avant la lettre. He becomes a poet, the highest form of humanity, consisting of a living, paradoxical, and constantly self-renewing harmonious union of a number of mutually opposite archetypal elements. Thus, among other things, the emerging supreme poetical man is an androgynous "hieros gamos" or sacred wedlock of the "anima"

(an aspect of the "collective unconscious" or of the oceanic soul called the "id" by Freud), and of the "masculine" archetype of the "ego," of the conscious mind or "logos." Indeed, in both works, the final heroes, or rather character-configurations, are Heinrich-Mathilde in Novalis' case, and Wanderer-Mathilde, in Perk's case. They are mutual assimilations, transformations of the "ego" into the full-fledged self, "conjunctiones oppositorum" in Jung's terminology, not rationally explicable, but mysteries. They are fusions of the conscious mind and the initially unconscious, inborn, interior power in man, nature and the universe, a power which both authors refer to as "Gewissen" or "geweten," the latter becoming known or actualized in a biological-psychological growth process. They view this absolute power as identical with the (platonic) Ideal, with "the good" or virtue, with the beautiful and the sublime, with the truth, with the Godhead, and as identity within the human psyche of the "inner" and "outer" universe.

Both works also put into prominence two key sub-motifs, the symbolic underworld motif of the miners and of the hermit's cave in Novalis' novel (similar to the creative Night-Womb motif of his Hymnen an die Nacht), and the celestial Astralis motif, both appearing in admirable poetic concentration in Perk's Eene Helle- en Hemelvaart, which he published separately from the Mathilde cycle. The night-cave motif seems to be an ante litteram illustration in both Novalis and Perk of the Jungian "collective unconscious," especially in view of the numerous concomitant "anima" and "earth-mother" archetypal symbols in both authors' works, with which Heinrich and the Wanderer have an unconscious relationship of religious "incest."

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As they are distilled from an admittedly interpretative examination of Novalis' and Perk's creative works, these purely thematic and motivic findings may appear shaky or challengeable. Yet, a good case can be made for them from a careful comparative scrutiny of both authors' and Jung's theoretical utterances. Because their conceptual formulations are more precise, they provide much more reliable evidence for our sweeping identifications. These theoretical utterances abound in Perk's essays, in Novalis' famous Fragmente and other aphoristic notations, in the Sylvester-Heinrich dialogue in his novel, and of course in all of Jung's works by dint of their theoretical nature. This evidence will be examined in four groups of concepts: firstly, the concept of "geweten"; secondly, the Being-Consciousness problem and the related feeling-intellect split or eventual synthesis; thirdly, the inborn organicity or bodily component of "geweten" or "the collective unconscious," and its creativity as "drive" or "imagination"; and fourthly, a number of correlated views on virtue, ethics, genius, "Bildung," "culture," all seen in relation to a principle which, following Jung, I call "poetic synchronicity."

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"Gewissen" or "geweten"

After having used the terms "feeling," "emotions," "the heart," which he called the "key of the world and of life" (PW I 606, no. 381) or the "sacred, religious organ" (PW II 523, 570, no. 104),¹ Novalis finally resorted to the term "Gewissen" to indicate nothing less than the inborn, creative, divine essence of man, of his culture and of society, the very pattern and source of their development. In 1798-99 he noted: "Our 'Gewissen' alone already proves our relationship--or connection--or potential of transcend-

ence into another world--an inner and autonomous power. . . . Through the connection with the Father [=God] one can accomplish miracles" (PW II 448, no. 934). In the Sylvester dialogue, he wrote: "'Gewissen' is . . . the Deity directly operating among mankind" (I 332-33).

Perk, too, as an adolescent already, in his essays and letters from 1877 on, most decidedly and unequivocally hailed "het geweten" as man's divine essence and as his source of power. For Perk "het geweten" is "the God of our life" (PDO 114), our "innermost core" as "higher authority, . . . the authority of God's leading hand" (PDO 83); "God speaks through our 'geweten'" (PDO 95), which therefore is universal, "ons aller geweten" (PDO 81). It is quite simply "the Godhead in man" (PDO 123), "a voice if you want to call it so," which "leads" (PDO 81, 83, 121).

As Novalis and Perk invoke it, "geweten" bears a strong resemblance to what Jung later was to call "the collective unconscious," a resemblance which is clearly visible if we care to look through this Darwinian and post-Darwinian scientific terminology. Indeed, the "collective unconscious," as "the foundation of the whole structure of the personality, . . . a storehouse of latent memory traces inherited from man's ancestral past, a past that includes his prehuman and animal ancestry as well,"² is thus "pre-existent."³ As the "unlimited sum of fundamental psychic conditions,"⁴ "the inborn, preconscious and unconscious individual structure of the psyche, is a . . . tremendously complicated . . . a priori factor in all human activities";⁵ it even determines the mode of our cognitive faculties.⁶ Turning later to more traditional terms, similar to those used by Novalis and Perk, Jung also defined the "collective unconscious" as "the inner equivalent of Creation, of the world as a whole."⁷ As the basis of the "soul," it "makes the metaphysical assertion of God's numinous a priori power," as "man's soul is the light of the Godhead, and the Godhead

is the soul."⁸ Novalis too had realized that what he later called "Gewissen" was at first unconscious: "I can have a will--do something--without knowing about it" (PW I 552, no. 118). Perk also found that "'Geweten' is above all 'unconscious will'" (PDO 106).

To another "Tachtiger," Albert Verwey, "geweten" appears as the "cor cordium," the heart of hearts, in the poem of the same title. Here follows a prose rendering of its key lyrical passage written in 1886: "Soul of my soul! Life, which in me dwells, multinamed Mystery, which I call my ego, my self, my essence-- . . . forgive! I cannot know who you are, I do not see the end of what lasts eternally. Consciousness does not reveal the Unconscious-- we live and perish, you are always; but with you stays what you drive into our hearts and all that, in your honour, we say in Song."

As for van Eeden, although a notion similar to "geweten" underlies all of his works, I wish to document it here from an almost unknown work of his, written in German and published in 1911 as the first part of a book called Welt-Eroberung durch Heldenliebe. (Its second part was written by a Mr. Volker.) Van Eeden evokes an "original" "organic" capacity coming "from the depths of the Spirit," operating as "kingly love" in such "kingly men, or prophets, poets, sages" as Plato or Tolstoy, in a quiet way, like the Taoistic "doing in [or by] not-doing."⁹

"Geweten" or "the collective unconscious" was also posited by the young Hofmannsthal already under the platonic term "Prae-existenz," an inborn state of being or power towards which human development returns, more or less actualising it either in a short-circuited narcissistic (introverted) way, or through the world (work, procreation, the child, in short "das Soziale") in a full-fledged developmental manner, or in an oscillation of both.¹⁰

The Problem of Being and Consciousness

If we turn now from Perk's and Novalis' positions concerning consciousness to the philosophical problem of its relation to being, we will see even more clearly how closely analogous their beliefs are, and how deeply rooted in an idealism permeated by a psychological perception of life.

In his Fichte studies (1795-97) and later too in his other philosophical notations (PW I and II), Novalis dealt in considerable detail with this problem, especially as it appears in the philosophy of identity of the German Romantic Idealism of his day.

Like Fichte, Novalis started from SUM (I am): "The self-positing of the I ('I am I', a = a) as absolutethetic capacity is . . . the infinite, absolute I, which cannot be comprehended" (PW I 104, no. 1; 282, no. 633; 106, no. 3). As the "Original Act"¹¹ this self-positing is a supremely paradoxical act of splitting ("Alienation" which, incidentally, leads to "Production") and reunion, "one and divided at the same time" (PW I 126, no. 32), "a distinguishing and a connecting, a dividing and a uniting" (PW I 104-5, no. 1; 106, no. 2) of the "empirical I" and the "not-I". Novalis soon called these two "recognition" (=consciousness, subject) and "being" (=object). They exist only by virtue of each other: "Where there is a consciousness, there is also a being; . . . where there is a being, there must also be a consciousness" (PW I 248, no. 462; 245, no. 463). Thus the split inevitably also strives towards restoring the unity: "The capability of being-and-recognition can be found in the individual" (PW I 248, no. 462). This paradoxical compound is nothing less than the "absolute I," the "Gewissen" or "collective unconscious" in each individual.

Perk too posited SUM: "Everybody knows that he is, i.e., that he has consciousness of himself" (PDO 81).

From the start "geweten" was for Perk the source and substrate of this consciousness: "'Geweten' knows itself, has consciousness" (PDO 123). Like Novalis, Perk recognized the division (or, if you like, alienation), in our "geweten," and he too saw this split as a creative power: "Production". Man, and especially the "genius" (the artist-poet in whom "geweten" operates untrammelled), "can split ['verdubbelen'] himself and . . . stand opposite to himself. . . . What concerns himself he can view with the eyes of someone outside of him" (PDO 118). Perk also recognized that this eventual self-knowledge of "geweten" implies that to be a subject and to be aware of oneself as an object, is one and the same: "Geweten" implies that we are subjects, and have ourselves as objects at the same time, that our being aware of or having a consciousness, a soul and a body is thus identical with and inseparable from being a consciousness, a soul and a body. Heinrich-Novalis had come to the same conclusion: "Thus the sense [= 'Gewissen' or consciousness] would be a part of the new world itself which it has opened up? One would understand a thing only if one had it?"¹² That is to say, if one had it in oneself, and if one were it too.

Jung implied a similar realization when he wrote: "All understanding and all that is understood are psychic as such."¹³ Perk too found that "The soul transports itself into the origins of actions [and things], animates them from itself, thinks its own so-ness ['zijne Ikheid'] into them" (PDO 116). Novalis already had given a Jungian, almost existentialist, twist to this idealistic view of consciousness: "The most wonderful, the eternal phenomenon, is one's own existence" (PW I 362, no. 21). In a famous Fragment he had almost shouted out: "Is then the universe not in us? We cannot fathom the depths of our mind. Inward goes the mysterious way. In us, or nowhere is eternity and its worlds--the past and the future" (PW I 418, no. 14).

The Being-Consciousness "original act" has its implications concerning the opposite faculties of feeling and intellect. In "recognition-being" Novalis¹⁴ on the one hand aligned "recognition" with "reflection," i.e., with thought, intellect, "the form of the original act," producing rational "representations" and "concepts"; and on the other hand he linked up "being" with "feeling," i.e., "sentiment," "the heart," "the substance (happening) of the original act," producing "apperception" or "contemplation." "The original act thus links up reflection and feeling" (PW I 116, no. 19), he stated; in other words, "there is of necessity always a connection between the intellect and feeling" (PW I 117); their union is the ultimate mode of human awareness: "Nothing surpasses the synthesis of feeling and reflection" (PW I 118, no. 20). It is the "suprasensual" or "unsensual" "recognition" he was to envisage later, as the capacity par excellence of "Gewissen" (PW I 420, no. 23; 550, no. 118).

For Perk too "'geweten' . . . is composed of the knowledge of the intellect and the knowledge of the heart" (PDO 81). He believed "the heart" to be the primary component: "It is the most precious value of mankind" (BD 101), "superior to everything else . . .; science without warm love . . . is nothing, a mere soap-bubble" (PDO 111). Novalis had taken the same stance: "Feeling seems to be the primary thing--reflection the secondary one" (PW I 114, no. 16, 17).

In his theory of personality, Jung too started from the polar distinction between the faculties of thinking and feeling. A harmonious balance between the two is one of the aims and achievements of successful individuation.

The Innateness and Organicity of "Gewissen" and Its Creative Drive

For Novalis "'Gewissen' inhabits and animates the delicate symbol called the human body" (I 332). He never

wavered from considering "Gewissen" as the primary element; but the body, its organs and its senses with their "plenitude of experiences" are almost equally important, the soul being "spirit mixed with body" (PW I 582, no. 245; II 293, no. 296). To him, "the active use of the organs is nothing but a magic miraculous thinking" (PW II 460, no. 1075). The inner and the outer world, i.e., also the soul and the body ". . . must totally interrelate down even to smallest detail--for as wholes they are polar opposites" (PW I 293, no. 653). "Body-Soul . . . anybody who knows this distinction will posit a communion between both, by virtue of which they mutually act upon each other" (PW I 272, no. 568).

For Perk too "the body is fused with the soul in intimate harmony" (PDO 95, 108), and man is "a mixture of the sensuous and supersensuous human natures" (PDO 103). "Especially the brain" (PDO 141) and "the nerves are the tools of the immortal human breath of life ('lebensadem,' or 'geweten')" (PDO 124). "Nobler than the flesh" (PDO 141), they are "intermediaries between matter and soul" (PDO 127). As a post-Darwinian Jung also saw the "collective unconscious" (his term for 'Gewissen') as "grounded in the intrinsic nature of the living organism itself," genetically "inherited with the brain structure," possibly even with "a nervous substrate like the sympathetic system."¹⁵

As it is built into the body as an inborn, organically founded "seed," "Gewissen" is directly and immediately convincing, all-knowing. Novalis drove home this point in a rhetorical question: "How can a man have awareness of something if he does not have the seed of it in him? What I am to understand I have to develop in me organically-- and what I seem to learn is merely food, stimulation ('Inzitament') to the organism" (PW I 418-19). In the Sylvester dialogue he was to call this "seed" an "imprinted design" (I 327), anticipating the modern term "Gestalt" or "configurational pattern." "Gewissen" as a seed is "the pure earnest will, which in the decisive moment makes

up its mind and chooses immediately" (I 322). It is "an experience of direct certainty" (PW I 420, no. 23), "a spirit springing fresh from the infinite source" (I 327). Perk too saw "geweten" as a "seed ['kiem'] already somewhat developed at birth" (PDO 131), "a collection of gifts, talents and dispositions ['aanlagen'] . . . in the final analysis planted in our heart by the all-governing Deity" (PDO 87).

"Geweten" works fast, immediately: "It flies through entire human lives in moments" (PDO 117); "To think many things all at once and fast is the aim of our striving, of our divine destiny . . ." (PDO 123); and again: "The truth of a pronouncement can be assayed by the sudden and simultaneous . . . and intertwined rising up of countless facts, sayings and other utterances of the human spirit" (PDO 122). Perk found that "the fast poetical mind . . . prophetically . . . envisions in a flash of intuition and as a revelation what is laboriously investigated and explained by the researcher or philosopher" (PDO 123). This echoes Novalis almost verbatim: "It seems to me that there are two ways to gain knowledge of human history. One, laborious and interminable . . . , the way of experience; the other one, almost a single leap, the way of inner contemplation . . . viewing the nature of each event and each matter immediately and directly . . . in their living manifold interrelations" (I 208).

"Gewissen" is also a force, a will, of a partly biological nature. For Novalis it comes into being as the "absolute I", dividing itself in the "original action" or "alienation-production," and produces "polarly arranged forces,"¹⁶ "drive" or "action,"¹⁷ which he sometimes also called "will"¹⁸ and rarely, but clearly in anticipation of Freud and Jung, "instinct".¹⁹ It leads to creation, love and procreation: "The essence of the spirit consists of procreation. . . . the Act of self-embracing" (PW I 541, no. 74).

Thus Novalis ascribed "drive" to "Gewissen" and spoke of the "drive" or "power" of "Gewissen" (I 330, 331), which "is capable of putting into action all spiritual components" of man (I 332). It is "a power creating meaning and universes . . . the spirit of the World Poem, . . . of the infinitely varying total life, . . . the creative foundation of all Being" (I 331).

Freud was to refer to it as "libido." Jung's concept of libido as psychic energy in general is even more akin to Novalis' views. Even natural laws such as "equivalence," "entropy" and "enantio-dromia" (current and countercurrent), which Jung ascribed to the libido and which led to his formulation of the Self (and the World) as "coincidentia oppositorum," were anticipated by Novalis in his concept of "polar forces," which give the impulse to the dialectical process. "Activity . . . is the medium, the vehicle of all change (=development). Change and activity mutually determine each other" (PW I 293, no. 652). For Perk too "geweten" is "an inner drive," an "action" or the "capability of it" (PDO 98-99), a "power of creation" (PDO 116).

Views on Virtue, Freedom, Education,
Personality or Genius, and Society

Independently of each other, Novalis, Perk and Jung evolved similar views on these ideas also. They believed them to be forces emanating from the innate creative "Gewissen" or "collective unconscious," forces felt to be what the Romans called "fas," a priori cosmic creative power, nature itself as part of the Deity. In no way did they consider these elements of culture and the universe to be "ius," abstracted a posteriori from the practice of "mores" of society. Thus, we see that they hold an idealistic-religious position in these matters also.

Indeed, for Novalis "all of nature exists only by the essence of virtue" (I 333). The etymology of the word he

uses implied "what is effective, valid" through "Gewissen." "All of nature" means not only "the echoes of the old in-human nature, but also rousing voices of higher nature, of the heavenly 'Gewissen' in us" (I 330). Inspired by Fichte, Novalis also found that "morality simply does not edict anything specific--it is 'Gewissen'--merely a judge without laws. . . . Prescriptive laws are essentially the contrary of true morality" (PW III 685, no. 670), as they are merely ". . . the complement of deficient natures and beings" (PW II 284, no. 250); "'Gewissen' does not consist of separate virtues" (I 332). The essence of morality is above all "bliss" or "happiness" (PW II, 293, no. 296), and consists of agreement with "Gewissen." "Virtue is the Deity directly working among mankind" (I 332), so that "ethics is really religion, so-called theology in its most real meaning" (I 332, cf. also 333). "To act morally and to act religiously are thus most intimately united" (PW II 250, no. 62). For Novalis, "the spirit of fable [i.e., poetic capability] is the spirit of virtue in a friendly garb" (I 332).

For Perk too morality springs from "geweten," which "knows everything that is good for our moral good" (PDO 81); morality is God's voice, "on account of laws of heredity existing also in the moral realm" (PDO 93). Goodness or virtue is a form of God's love (PDO 93). And Perk's ethics are as eudaemonistic as Novalis': "To be content ['te-vreden'] is man's destiny. In man there is a striving for happiness, satisfaction, quietude. This striving is virtue" (PDO 109). Virtue is a "striving for the happiness of the eternal in us, . . . for the 'turning into spirit' . . . , the identification with God, immortality" (PDO 85-6; 112). In a poem of the Mathilde cycle, Perk states: "He who carries out what his nature ['aard'] commands, is good" (VG 87, no. 69). "Aard" here is "geweten," universally as well as individually human, "eigenheid." In other words, "perfect yourselves, then you will all become good and beautiful" (VG 86, no. 68).

Self-love is the love of destiny and inner character, amor fati. "True freedom obeys the laws" (VG 16), the "laws" of "geweten" of course, those of "fas," not of "ius."²⁰

For Novalis freedom in obedience to the inner "Geweten" was as essential an element of his ethics as it was to be for Perk. It is already of necessity present in the "original action," because the latter came about without being determined by any outside factor: "It is, because it is, not because another act is" (PW I 105, no. 1). "The categories [composing the 'original action'] must be free modes of action or forms of thinking" (PW I 112, no. 12). This statement suggests that Novalis used the term "categories" for what Jung later was to call "the archetypal patterns per-se." Freedom in amor fati [i.e., love of "Gewissen" or nature] is an "activity": "In the concept of 'activity' the concept of freedom is already implicit" (PW I 205, no. 286); "all action expands freedom" (PW I 289, no. 649). As the categories in the "original action" appear in bipolarity, freedom results from the "polar forces" of the opposites: "Freedom is the basis and sphere of contrast, of the idea" (PW I 202, no. 284) and consists of a capability of hovering between series of opposite "archetypal" forces and encompassing them. This capability is the hallmark of the "creative imagination" (PW I 188, no. 249): "The capability of being free is the productive imagination--harmony is the condition of its activity--of the hovering between opposites . . . all being, being in general is nothing but being free--a hovering between extremes, which necessarily have to be united and necessarily have to be separated. . . . This hovering is the source, the matrix of all reality, reality itself" (PW I 266, no. 555). This "elective freedom" is poetical--that is why "morality is basically poetry" (PW II 417, no. 769). Thus, the idealistic world-view reveals itself as esthetic, or even estheticist. "The poet: . . . all literary creation operates in bipolarity, and his freedom in connecting makes him boundless.

All poetical nature is nature . . . his evocations must at least be symbolic, like nature itself" (PW II 693, no. 705).

Perk developed the same ideas in an almost identical terminology: "Geweten" is a "disposition to becoming a genius" (PDO 131), and the poetic genius "uses the all-governing imagination . . . and believes that he is hovering outside of his body, that he is free from his animal casing" (PDO 117). This description recalls the state of "elevation" or "hemelvaart," i.e., a small dying, in which everything is viewed simultaneously. As in Novalis, the "power of imagination" consists of "sure fast thinking, fast feeling, fast movements of the soul, . . . leading from man to spirit" (PDO 116). The genius "experiences many things, and simultaneously" (PDO 117, cf. 122). Perk also had an inkling of what Novalis first called "categories" and Jung "archetypes per-se," and of their bio-psychological innateness: "The laws of heredity . . . also exist in the moral sphere" (PDO 107). He even specified: "Each human soul is composed of the same traits and elements; characters are formed by the rising up ['het bovendrijven'] of some of these traits, to which everything else is made subservient. The genius has all human character traits rising up" (PDO 117).

Thus the world, according to Novalis, is "actualised imagination or 'Gewissen,' perceptible to the senses" (PW II 252, no. 70). Through "Gewissen," God "appears in each earnest formation, in each truth formed" by the genius (I 331); the "master," whose work thus transcends him: "it has become more than its creator--he has unconsciously become organ and property of a higher power" (PW II 411, no. 737). This world, the "formed truth," the poetical work, language and nature, actualised Being, are all symbolic, and suggestive of this power (PW I 169, nos. 219-20; 108-11; 176-82). The Jungian distinction between "mere sign" and "symbol" was anticipated by Novalis: "Sign-Image. In the sign the concept prevails-- in the Image the apperception" (PW I 188, no. 249). This

apperception "is not seeing--not hearing--not feeling-- it is composed of all three--more than this--an awareness of direct certainty" (PW I 420, no. 23). This capability of apperception through symbols was also evoked by Perk: "The moved soul desires expression . . . the metaphor ['beeldspraak,' i.e., symbolic language] results" (PDO 104), through "a force called 'verbeeldingskracht' ['image-ination'], capable of putting into images creations which cannot be perceived by means of the senses, because they really are perceived by inner apperception ['aanschouwing']" (PDO 116, cf. 135). He also used the terms "intuition" (PDO 98, 110), and "higher senses" (PDO 125), revealing "suprasensual life" (PDO 125). In his definition of "intuition" Jung comes to similar formulations: "Intuition is . . . an apperception and in-perception . . . an actively creative process . . . which produces images which are not produced by the other functions at all, or are reached by them only through long-winded roundabout ways."²¹

"Gewissen" thus is the world, God-nature in its pristine, potential form; it is "the heavenly pristine man," as Novalis put it (I 322). Indeed, as "Gewissen," "we are God, as individuals we reflect." In other words, "our nature [= being] is immanent" (as "seed" in the body), "our reflecting is transcendent" (PW I 168, no. 218). "Gewissen," which is the "holy Spirit" (PW II 690, no. 688), is thus immanent and transcendent, like God Himself, "living knowledge" (PW II 690, no. 685), as such "more than the Bible" (PW II 690, no. 688). It is therefore sacred, divinely mysterious, leading to what Jung calls the "mysterium coniunctionis" of individuation and symbolic universe. It is, in Novalis' words, the "mystery of the highest indivisibility" (I 331), and leads us back to our origin, "inwards the mysterious way goes," since "the Spirit goes out, back to itself" (PW I 430, no. 43). Perk too perceived "geweten" and its emanations, genius, love, art, and world,

as "sacred" (PDO 127); "the geniuses are the holiest in mankind . . . one thanks the Deity in them" (PDO 131-32). His concept of "God" was also an immanent-transcendent one.

Synchronicity

At a given point in his thinking, Jung had come to the conclusion that in the intuition of "Gewissen" or the "collective unconscious" and in its effects on shaping the world, a principle is at work, transcending causality and finality, viz. "synchronicity." In his words: "It takes the coincidence of events in space and time as meaning something more than mere chance, namely, a peculiar interdependence of objective events among themselves as well as with the subjective (psychic) states of the observer or observers."²² As this "peculiar interdependence" also concerns future events "represented in the present by a corresponding phantasm (dream or vision),"²³ synchronicity is the operating principle in such time-honoured practices as divination and oracle interpretation.²⁴ Novalis anticipated the essential elements of this remarkable concept of Jung's in his many musings about chaos, order, chance, fate or destiny, and calling. In his eyes "the future world is chaos made reasonable--chaos which permeated itself" (PW II 281, no. 239), which is the same as what he meant by "moralisation of nature" (PW II 250, no. 60; 622, no. 601; I 330). This occurs through meaningful chance, through fate, in accordance with "fas," not "ius." So-called chance is an aspect of "Gewissen" as Will: "one wills 'chance events' by 'chance'" (PW I 249, no. 462). Novalis anticipated the concept of synchronicity as he further elaborated on this seeming redundancy: "the generality of each chance moment stays on, for it is in the whole," (*ibid.*), i.e., in the Deity operating in "Gewissen." He also found that "very many chance events, many natural events provide real revelations with respect to life, world and fate" (PW 420, no. 23).

Even more suggestive of synchronicity is his utterance that "the conjuncture of chance events is not again chance, but law--the result of the most recondite and planning wisdom" (PW I 662), the law of "fas" obviously. Thus human development is "elevation of chance into essence--into destiny" (PW II 393, no. 685; cf. PW I 584, no. 248). In this connection, Novalis even used the term "synchronistic," saying of Shakespeare: "History, what is history to the poet . . . is history as it should be--prophetic and synchronistic . . . a true poetical play" (PW II 685, no. 668), for "playing is experimenting with chance events" (PW II 574, no. 141). Synchronicity is but another sign of "Gewissen," of "the directly operating Deity among mankind" (I 332-33).

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A summarizing characterisation of the common world-view which we just reviewed should perhaps be attempted. It shows itself as an "idealism" in that it posits the origin of the inner and outer phenomena, man and universe, to be an a priori absolute entity or Deity planting itself into the body or brain as a dynamism, and intuited there (in the "psyche") as an immanent yet transcendent idea or ideal. Thus it also appears as a "psychological" idealism. Man and universe are experienced as a conglomerate of bipolarly arranged archetypal factors (categories, traits) and corresponding symbolic images. The a priori inborn dynamism making this perception possible is the creative "synchronistic" poetic "image-ination," actually felt to spring from the immanent Deity. Hence, this idealism can also be described as an "esthetic" and a "religious" one.

From research I recently carried out on Perk's unpublished prose, the virtual certainty has emerged that he arrived at what sometimes seem to be almost verbatim quotations from Novalis in total independence from Novalis'

writings. The remarkable similarity between the two is clearly not due to any direct process of influence, imitation or borrowing, but rather to the similarity of their immanent personalities, as they are based on the universal "collective unconscious" in them. This makes me believe that Novalis', Perk's and Jung's brands of idealism will never be really "out of date."

NOTES

¹Key to the reference symbols in the text:

VG = Jacques Perk. Verzamelde Gedichten, Ed. by G. Stuiveling, Amsterdam, De Arbeiderspers, 1958.

PDO = Jacques Perk. Proeven in Dicht en Ondicht. Ed. by G. Stuiveling, Amsterdam, De Arbeiderspers, 1958.

BD = Jacques Perk. Brieven en Documenten. Ed. by G. Stuiveling, Amsterdam, De Arbeiderspers, 1959.

I = Novalis. Schriften. Das dichterische Werk. Ed. by R. Samuel, H.-J. Mähl and G. Schulz, Stuttgart, Kohlhammer Verlag, 1960, 3rd. ed. 1977.

PW I = Novalis. Schriften. Das philosophische Werk. Ed. by R. Samuel, H.-J. Mähl and G. Schulz, Stuttgart, Kohlhammer Verlag, 1965.

PW II = Novalis. Schriften. Das philosophische Werk II. Ed. by R. Samuel, H.-J. Mähl and G. Schulz, Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1968.

²C. G. Jung, in C. S. Hall and G. Lindzey, Theories of Personality, 2nd ed. New York, 1966, pp. 83, 84.

³C. G. Jung, in Fordham, Frieda, An Introduction to Jung's Psychology, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 3rd ed. 1966, p. 24.

⁴C. G. Jung, in Jacobi, Jolande, Complex, Archetype and Symbol in the Psychology of C. G. Jung, New York, Pantheon, 1959, p. 59.

⁵C. G. Jung, Four Archetypes, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2nd ed. 1971, p. 11.

⁶C. G. Jung, in Jacobi, p. 36.

⁷C. G. Jung, in Jacobi, pp. 59-60.

⁸C. G. Jung, in De Laszlo, Violet S., ed., Psyche and Symbol. A Selection of the Writings of C. G. Jung, New York, Anchor Books, no. 136, 1958, p. 287.

⁹Frederik van Eeden and Volker, Welt-Eroberung durch Heldenliebe, Berlin and Leipzig, Schuster and Loeffler, 1911, pp. 9, 14, 40, 45-46, 48, 53.

¹⁰This summary of Hofmannsthal's statements on "Prae-existenz" is based on his personal notes of 1916, later published under the title "Ad me ipsum" (See Hugo von Hofmannsthal, Gesammelte Werke in zehn Einzelbänden, Frankfurt a.M., Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1980, vol. 2168, Reden und Aufsätze III - Aufzeichnungen, pp. 599-627). That van Eeden's work helped Hofmannsthal in these self-evaluating notes is suggested by the fact that he possessed a copy of Welt-Eroberung durch Heldenliebe. In this copy, now in the Hofmannsthal Archives in the "Freies Deutsches Hochstift" in Frankfurt a.M., Hofmannsthal wrote that he read and annotated it on at least two occasions, viz, on June 19, 1912, in Rodaun, and on Sept. 5, 1916, in Aussee.

¹¹Novalis, in PW I 105, no. 1; 107, no. 3; 113-14, no. 15; 115-16, no. 17; 119-25, nos. 22-31.

¹²Novalis, in I 331. My italics, RB.

¹³C. G. Jung, in Wehr, Gerhard, C. G. Jung in Selbstzeugnissen, Reinbek bei Hamburg, Rowohlt, 1969, p. 35.

¹⁴Novalis, in PW I 114-15, no. 17; 116, no. 19; 119, no. 22; 232, no. 379.

¹⁵C. G. Jung, in Jacobi, pp. 37, 38, 39.

¹⁶Novalis, in PW I 186, no. 246, Novalis actually speaks of "Wechselkraft," i.e., "alternating power."

¹⁷PW I 213, no. 301.

¹⁸PW I 354, no. 512.

¹⁹PW II 650, no. 554.

²⁰The complex paradox of Perk's ethics is concisely formulated in his sonnet "Twee Rozeblaadjes," VG 100, no. 82, in the two tercets.

²¹C. G. Jung, Psychologische Typen, Zürich, Rascher Verlag, 1946, pp. 525-26.

²²C. G. Jung, in De Laszlo, pp. 228-29.

²³C. G. Jung, in De Laszlo, p. 202.

²⁴C. G. Jung, in De Laszlo, p. 224.